For all of our good words, good works, and best intentions, what ecocritical scholars value seems radically at odds with what policy-makers seem to value, and we’ve got to wonder at some point if we are really making a whit of difference. We realize the relative value of ourselves as scholars when a person like George W. Bush can have such a potentially devastating effect on the environment by pulling the U.S. out of the Kyoto Accord and, despite repeated rejections from the U.S. Senate, announcing in early February 2004 that he will pressure the U.S. Congress to open Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife refuge to drilling by oil companies. Moreover, we realize that if ecocriticism is to have any effect outside of the narrow confines of academia, then it must not only define itself but also address the issue of values in ways that connect meaningfully with the non-academic world. In terms of theory, it is going to have to stop running and hiding for fear of being rendered hopeless as a political engine.

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Since 1996, ecocriticism has burgeoned into a huge discipline with many practitioners and followers. The Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment (ASLE) began in 1992 in the U.S. under the founding principle of inclusivity, and the association has since expanded to include branches in the UK, Korea, Japan, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand. Canada, too, recently joined the club with its version of ASLE called ALECC (The Association for Literature, the Environment, and Culture in Canada / Association pour la littérature, l’environnement, et la culture au Canada). Embracing inclusivity, ASLE seeks all possible connections, as does ecocriticism, so much so, in fact, that it is sometimes difficult to tell where ecocriticism ends and nature studies begins. However, the two disciplines do differ in their commitment to praxis. As I have stated elsewhere (see my “Report Card”), ecocriticism has distinguished itself, debates notwithstanding, first by its ethical stance of commitment to the natural world as an important thing rather than simply as an object of thematic study and, secondly, by its commitment to making connections. Ecocriticism may be many other things besides, but it is always at least these two.

Like the feminist criticism with which it is often allied, ecocriticism maintains an ethical commitment that also implies a commitment to praxis and to direct effects upon the material world. Unlike feminist criticism, however, ecocriticism has not been adequately theorized; as Lawrence Buell claimed in 1999, “ecocriticism still lacks a paradigm-inaugurating statement like Edward Said’s Orientalism (for colonial discourse studies) or Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance Self-Fashioning (for new historicism)” (“Letter” 1091). While Buell sees this as a potential strength, perhaps what we might call the strategic intangibility that defined and bolstered ecocriticism’s inclusivity principle in the late 1990s is counterproductive now and actually threatens to undo ecocriticism. We still seem to be in this phase of strategic intangibility, and perhaps it is time to get beyond it. Possibly one way of doing this is by drawing some distinctions between feminist ecocriticism and ecofeminism and by resisting wholesale inclusion under the sign of ecocriticism. One of the dangers, of course, is that we will start “spinning off into obscurantism or idiosyncrasy” (Tallmadge et al. xv) or that we will fall under a spell of “mesmerization by literary theory” (Buell, Environmental Imagination 111).

Canada, despite lacking a long ASLE history, has been especially prolific in the area of a clearly feminist ecocriticism, with women such as Pamela Banting, Catriona Sandilands, and Diana Relke perhaps its best representatives. Still, even among the foremost scholars in the field, whether
American or Canadian, though there is a clearly implied intuitive recognition of Ynestra King’s claim that “the hatred of women and the hatred of nature are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing” (“Toward” 118), there is little theoretical distinction between ecofeminism and feminist ecocriticism; yet, the two fields each have a very different focus. Granting that there are ecofeminisms and ecocriticisms, we might venture some broad generalizations about the two spheres of investigation. ²

Why there has been little time and effort (relative to the efforts exerted on glorifying Thoreau) to explain the differences at any length is, perhaps, a matter for some speculation, but we may be certain that there are very real consequences of which we need to be aware when we do make the time and effort to look at the differences. One of these consequences is that in drawing a distinction between ecocriticism and ecofeminism we immediately seem to establish an agonistic discourse that sets ecofeminism and ecocriticism at each other’s throats as competing voices, perhaps even as a sort of gender war writ small in the rarefied airs of competing theoretical discourses. This argument is far less productive than building on the strengths of each approach, looking at ways they complement each other, and working toward defining more fully what each approach envisions. Another problem is that differentiating between ecofeminism and ecocriticism lands us in a bit of a catch-22: in choosing ecofeminist approaches, we privilege the social; in choosing ecocritical approaches, we subordinate feminism and make it a topic for inclusion rather than a primary topic. Nevertheless, there remain unexamined differences between the two approaches.

² While we must, of course, be wary of making any kind of generalization, we also do well to consider the arguments Jean Howard puts forward that “an almost obsessive fear of falling prey to a reductive ‘master narrative’ has severely inhibited the range and character of narrative being written about the [early modern] period” (33). Howard goes on to maintain that

a narrative of interconnections is not necessarily a “master narrative,” in the sense of aspiring to universal truth claims of the sort discredited by critiques of Enlightenment epistemologies. Rather, narratives of interconnection can be offered as alternatives to local and topical analyses, but alternatives whose usefulness can be judged only in terms of their greater explanatory power and fidelity to the facts as they are known than in terms of their absolute, supra-historical truth claims. (33)

This kind of argument can apply to discussions about methods of inquiry as much as to discussions about historical periods, at least in its disavowal of aspirations to reductivism and totalizing explanations. My purpose is to provide the partial and provisional comments Howard discusses but for two general theoretical camps—ecofeminism and ecocriticism.
When Ynestra King argues that “in ecofeminism, nature is the central category of analysis” (“Healing” 117) she is surely mistaken. Mary Mellor has explained that “although ecofeminists may differ in their focus, sex/gender differences are at the centre of their analysis” (69, emphasis added). Most ecofeminist scholars agree in the primacy of sex/gender differences over having “nature … the central category of analysis.” It is more the case that Nature is included in the discussion. King, in spite of her prioritizing of Nature in ecofeminism, seems to agree with this less prioritizing stand when she argues that “eco-feminist movement politics and culture must show the connection between all forms of domination, including the domination of nonhuman nature” (“Toward” 119), including but not beginning with it. As Greta Gaard and Patrick Murphy observe, this inclusionary view has been “generally embraced as a sound orientation” (3).

So even though “eco” comes first in both of the terms, in “ecofeminism” it is the second part of the term that has ontological priority. This means that ecofeminism is first a social theory, a human-centred approach; to some degree, ecocriticism tries to be something else, to move away from anthropocentric models.³ I would also propose that ecocriticism is always a feminist issue: as Karen Warren argues, “what makes something a feminist issue is that an understanding of it contributes in some important way to an understanding of the subordination of women” (Warren quoted in King, “Toward” 142). Ecocriticism that does not look at the relationship between the domination of women and the domination of the natural environment quite simply fails in its mandate to “make connections” and is quite simply not ecocriticism. What Patrick Murphy calls “nonfeminist ecological criticism” (92) is simply that: nonfeminist ecological criticism. It isn’t ecocriticism, and the distinction needs to be made and maintained.

³ Leo Marx contends that this anthropocentric/ecocentric binary constitutes the central debate about ecocriticism’s undefined character and that we can’t help confronting it. At the Fifth Biennial Conference of the Association for the Study of Literature and the Environment held in June 2003 in Boston, Marx and Lawrence Buell squared off in a debate on this binary, Marx aligning himself with the anthropocentric side by maintaining that people are “at the centre of environmental thinking” and represent “the most responsible agent of environmental devastation”; Buell, meanwhile, essentially took the opposite position. There seem to be at least two questions here: firstly, how far can we go from anthropocentric models and retain both the analytical and transformative potentials of ecocriticism? After all, surely humanity is central to effective environmental action and transformative analyses. The other question is equally compelling: if we don’t put Nature front and centre, doesn’t ecocriticism reiterate the very arrogance it critiques—namely, of humanity having dominion over everything?
Diana Relke’s work, though it doesn’t make the kinds of distinctions that seem increasingly necessary, is both feminist and ecological, and it reminds us of how surprisingly little work has been done on making available ecocritical readings of poetry written by women in Canada, compared with the ecocritical readings of American male poets. Even so, “nature has,” as Laurie Ricou argues, “loomed large in the Canadian consciousness,” and ecocriticism has been “almost an underground phenomenon” in Canada (Ricou quoted in Relke 205). Relke’s Greenwor(l)ds: Ecocritical Readings of Canadian Women’s Poetry is among the very best ecocritical work done in Canada at the turn of the century, and it is profoundly important work because, to quote from feminist ecocritic Catriona Sandilands, “as the eco-feminist and environmental justice movements have shown so eloquently, human experiences of nature are deeply affected and organized by power relations such as gender, race, and class” (“From Unnatural Passions” 31). Sandilands argues that not only do marginalized gender, class, and racial groups bear the brunt of the effects of environmental destruction but that our underlying conceptions of nature are also affected by political and social structures. This gestures toward “the necessity of affinity politics in formulating and enacting ecological actions and visions” (31–32). Relke’s readings represent an important step in this kind of project. One of the primary goals of her book is to refute the claims Northrop Frye makes in his influential Conclusion to the three-volume Literary History of Canada that there is “a tone of deep terror in regard to nature” in Canadian poetry, and, moreover, that Canadian poetry is characterized by a dualistic way of knowing nature. Frye argues that “The human mind has nothing but human and moral values to cling to if it is to preserve its integrity or even its sanity, yet the vast unconscionability of nature in front of it seems an unanswerable denial of those values” (Frye quoted in Relke 24). As Relke explains, the problem with Frye’s conclusions is that they stem from “perceptions … based upon the experience of poetry written almost exclusively by men” (25). One of the results of Frye’s remarkable essay, according to Relke, is that “the work of women poets either remained on the peripheries of Canadian myth criticism or was subjected to the imposition of this dualistic way of knowing nature” (25).

Relke’s readings (most of which are revised essays, previously published) take a tripartite approach. Relke explains that the essays are presented

in the order in which they were originally conceived … [and]
are grouped around three moments of feminist ecocritical

Relke’s readings represent an important step in this kind of project.
conscience that correspond to my engagement with particular places in particular poetic contexts. I call these three moments poetic consciousness, ecological consciousness, and ecocritical consciousness. (34)

Broadly speaking, the first section deals with the reception and construction of three women poets (Margaret Atwood, Majorie Pickthall, and Constance Lindsay Skinner) by the Canadian critical establishment. Working from a premise “that women’s perception of themselves and the world is uniquely different from male perceptions” (49), Relke discusses the critical failure to recognize resistance in the poems and the ways that the poems articulate split female subjectivities. These split subjectivities, Relke argues, illustrate, among other things, a wide gap between cultural and self-perceptions in the women of the poems. Apart from a few tantalizing suggestions, however, this first section of the collection fails to produce any serious theory, writing instead simplistic and unsophisticated comments that really need to be backed up if they are going to have any lasting value in ecocriticism.

One example is Relke’s comments about relationships between postcolonial theory and ecocriticism. While Relke is certainly correct in suggesting that there is huge work to be done in the area of postcolonial ecocriticism, there seems little justification, for instance, for her claim that Canadian postcolonial theory, developed during the eighties, tends to participate in the gender scepticism of that decade of theorizing in which there was a shifting away from a perception of Western culture as divided along gender lines toward one in which racial divisions were viewed as more determinative of relations of power. (98)

Arguing that postcolonial theory simply swaps gender with race as the seminal category of power relations is naïve, and it ignores (indeed, seems unaware of) the efforts of postcolonial theory to connect with feminist concerns in meaningful ways. Moreover, to imply that “postcolonial literary theory, grounded as it is in the work of the fathers of postmodernism and post-structuralism” (130), is detached and abstract, as Relke seems to imply, ignores the activist stance that postcolonial theory has always had, regardless of how successful this stance may or may not have been.

4 By 2007, some of this work seems to be underway, with such promising collection titles as “Postcolonial Green” and “Postcolonial Ecocriticism” in the offing.
Relke’s final chapter, “Does Nature Matter?,” argues that “matter matters” (321) and comes tantalizingly close to articulating a theoretical position that might account for the experience of the self “as constructed by a system other than the system of signs” and toward a theory that “biological nature has as much of a hand in ‘constructing’ us as do the signs that stand in for it” (321). But that’s the extent of it, and Relke shies away from any further exploration down that road. One of the possible routes Relke might have taken would have offered at least a look at how theories about subjectivity fit in with questions about the natural world.

One very promising attempt to go that extra step is in Catriona Sandilands’s book *The Good-Natured Feminist: Ecofeminism and the Quest for Democracy* (1999), which discusses how the “proliferation of discourses around nature … offers up the possibility of thinking of nature as an actor in the process of co-constructing the world” (196). Sandilands is concerned about including Nature in discussions about democracy, and she argues that in order to include Nature we need “a discursive construction of nature that intentionally opens up spaces for the experience of nature as other,” without essentializing or fixing that space of otherness onto marginalized groups; in other words, a view of Nature “as not always already within the confines of women’s—or anyone’s—discursive construction” (“Political Animals”). It is well beyond the range of this paper to say much more about the complex theoretical arguments Sandilands makes, except to note that she has taken the first steps toward a theoretically viable reconceptualization of Nature, a de-essentializing of it that allows us to include questions about identity without a deterministic view of our identities. This kind of reconceptualization of nature allows us to bring questions about identity into discussions of environment. If we are going to talk about how Nature matters, it seems that such theorizing is surely necessary.

In contrast with Sandilands, Relke assumes throughout her book that ecocriticism is *not* theory. She uses the term “ecocriticism” as if there were a stable and accepted definition for the term, and in her final chapter she states that “theory and ecocriticism … both expose the logocentrism and phallogocentrism that underpin Western thought” (320). In so separating theory on the one hand from ecocriticism on the other, Relke takes us backward to a time when there was no ecocriticism. If thematicism is held up as ecocriticism, then the term “ecocriticism” itself becomes little more than a new buzzword for the old practice of looking at Nature in literature. Moreover, if we look without theory at “nature” in literature, we face what I would contend is a profound danger of growing enamoured of Nature.
as a thing in literature through which we might comment on an author's artistic dexterity. An uncommitted thematicism effectively fetishizes the natural world in ways that facilitate and encourage precisely those principles of objectification that make cowboys like Bush do the things they do. Fetishizing an object doesn't free it from misuse but encourages and facilitates such misuse. We know that fetishizing women does women no good. We know also that fetishizing First Nations Canadians and Native Americans did no good, either; the notion of “noble savagery” speeded rather than slowed the genocide. I seriously doubt that fetishizing the natural world is in the best interests of ecocritical theory, if we assume that ecocriticism is any theory that is committed to effecting change by analyzing the function—thematic, artistic, social, historical, ideological, theoretical, or otherwise—of the natural environment, or aspects of it, represented in documents (literary or other) that contribute to material practices in material worlds. We participate in the very systems we critique when the natural world becomes our tool for uncommitted scholarship.

Praxis—real praxis—starts with theoretical connections that allow us to see how we participate in the systems we critique; thematicism doesn't allow us to see how, as individuals, we are complicit in those systems. The close thematic readings in Greenwor(l)ds do succeed, however, in stressing the importance of rethinking the Canadian critical tradition that has failed to deal adequately with the natural world, to see when Canadian women poets (such as Isabella Valancy Crawford) offer “an alternative epistemology of knowledge … of seeing and knowing the natural world” (178), and to adequately recognize the concept of “nation” in the writing of the natural world in Canadian women’s poetry.

More mature and expansive in many ways than the at times rambling Greenwor(l)ds, Scott Slovic and Terre Satterfield’s What’s Nature Worth? —Narrative Expressions of Environmental Values looks at the relationship between how literature might affect policy and decisions governments make about the natural world. A collection of interviews with twelve prominent environmental writers, this book investigates the relationship between moral conviction and emotional attachment on the one hand and market pricing on the other, and “one of the central purposes of [the] book is to find a way to bring the concept of ‘narrative expressions of value’ into the realm of stakeholder discussions of value and policy” (2–3). As much with the commentary preceding and following some of the interviews as with the interviews themselves, this book identifies both the strengths and weaknesses of narrative as a vehicle for the expression of value. For example, as Satterfield comments in the interview with Terry Tempest
Williams, “ambiguity isn’t a very comfortable premise” for the research world, and “decision makers want to know clearly, and with some stability, what people think” (71). Yet there is wisdom and effectiveness, as both editors note, in “presenting technical information in narrative form” (22). This is, perhaps, the primary contradiction of narrative. It works because, as William Kittredge explains during his interview, it “helps readers [and listeners] to internalize values, making them their own, emotionally, as necessary to life rather than simply interesting or distracting, as platforms from which to act” (25). It doesn’t, however, seem to make much of a difference in the world of people like Bush, and we can’t really quantify what narrative does in terms of how value translates into policy. President Clinton brandishing a copy of *Testimony* with the announcement that “This made a difference” (62) is certainly an exception. Most narrative doesn’t work quite so directly, and many writers and storytellers who are serious about making a difference probably can’t help but feeling some of the “eco-despair” Scott Slovic mentions in his Foreword to *The Greening of Literary Scholarship* and to wonder as Alison Hawthorne Deming does in *What’s Nature Worth?*, “[W]hat good is a poem or an essay when nature is dying and we are to blame?” (117).

But it is even more complicated than that, and, as Ofelia Zepeda shows, some of the variables that determine or are determined by audience (age, background, culture, gender, sexuality) make it very difficult to talk meaningfully about how relationships between “story” and policy could possibly be fixed. Certainly, there is no doubt that the interviews demonstrate “that cost-benefit analyses lack the kind of voice and meaning that are central to how everyday people talk about those values” (64), but such—and it is one of the stated goals of the book—seems not to require a lot of evidence or argument. To move from the premise that people who do cost-benefit analyses walk and talk in totally different circles than those of “everyday people” to a plan of action does not seem quite so obvious or easy. Nor does the book really offer a satisfying strategy. Satterfield rightly argues that the goal is not

to convert the language of policy: we’re simply interested in allowing narrative to be the language of the public talking to the policy community or even the research community. As it stands, you don’t even get heard as an average person unless you can talk the official language, which may hide more than it reveals. (73)

At the same time, though, as Alison Hawthorne Deming points out,
legislation, information, and instruction cannot effect change at [the] emotional level—though they can play a significant role. Art is necessary because it gives us a new way of thinking and speaking, shows us what we are and what we have been blind to, and gives us new knowledge and forms in which to see ourselves. (122)

Indeed, as Scott Slovic points out, “some people argue that it would be beneficial to reform the very language of law and policy, to introduce narrative writing, nature writing, into the professional language of law and policy” (192). However, such invasive involvement risks “‘killing’ ... stories by converting them into policy statements” (67), and, anyway, it seems unlikely that such a reform could ever possibly be implemented.

Of course, it is language that poses the most obvious problem in any kind of relationship between ecocritical scholars and policy-makers. The two groups certainly don’t hang out in the same places, study the same things, pursue the same goals, or use the same language. No question about it: what we do and what they do is radically at odds, and calculating the terms of a relationship between the two groups means selling the idea of such a relationship to policy-makers rather than waiting for them to court us. They won’t. Still, there is a case to be made for the value of having such a relationship, and What’s Nature Worth? makes precisely such a case. Although narrative uses a different language and vocabulary than the language of policy (and policy-makers), it can be useful to policy-makers for many reasons. One of the effects, the editors argue, of narrative is that it can have “the potential power to define how audiences think of themselves, or society as a whole, and of the very planet” (19). It allows people to participate “emotionally in the events and processes they’re learning about” (20). Narrative “offers a way to imagine value with its full emotional valence” (20). This is in turn significant because it means that narrative is “a vital phenomenon even in a society that has, in some ways, attempted to remove itself from the narrative structure of information in favor of quantitative, decontextualized modes of presenting ideas and information” (20). The book is a first step, and it remains to be seen what kind of results we can expect from what seems a growing “open-mindedness toward the relevance of literary discourse (including narrative) to policy research” (3).

As the horror of another four years of a Texas cowboy in the White House unfolded amid equally horrifying bodybuilder gubernatorial politics in California, there was no doubt that we were losing. There is no doubt that our good words and intentions are continuing to fail to
make a meaningful difference. We’re losing because we are not connecting well enough. We’re losing because our values don’t sell and because we’re averse not only to marketing our values but to the very marketing processes themselves. Connecting with other activist-oriented theories is important, but it is not enough, especially when it shies away from following through on the theoretical implications that would help us to understand how racism and ecophobia and misogyny and homophobia are mutually reinforcing. Relke’s work is a brilliant beginning, a first attempt in a Canadian context to connect feminist and ecological literary concerns, but it is only a beginning. Satterfield and Slovic’s book is another brilliant beginning, one that takes us very far afield, deep into policy-maker country, but it, too, is directed at the converted—intellectually, it crosses over; in practical terms, it sells to intellectuals, not policy-makers. We’ve yet to cross the Great Divide between intellectuals and the world. But how?

Nature writer David Quammen wrote an e-mail to Scott Slovic in 1998, a part of which read as follows:

[A] writer who wants to influence how humans interact with landscape and nature should strive to reach as large an audience as possible and NOT preach to the converted. That means, for me, flavoring my work with entertainment-value, wrapping my convictions subversively within packages that might amuse and engage a large unconverted audience, and placing my work whenever possible in publications that reach the great unwashed. (Quammen quoted in Slovic viii)

Gregory McNamee seems to agree and argues in his interview in What’s Nature Worth? that “if you mean to engage the public in a discussion of values of land, literature is not the vehicle to do it. Journalism may be” (89). But can we write off literature quite so easily? Journalism does better reach the great unwashed, but this doesn't mean that literature is denied that privilege. Literature has often touched the popular imagination, and it continues to have the potential. McNamee’s professional bigotry against literature is a bit like Gary Nabhan’s professional bigotry against boiled-down pop versions of complex theories. As Nabhan states in his interview, “[T]he best-selling environmental book in the twentieth century is 50 Things You Can Do to Save the Earth. I mean, I would never look at it” (252). I have to wonder, “Not even a look?” Nabhan could learn something about reaching a broader audience. Of course, we are all familiar with pop psychology books or other trite materials that water down, vulgarize, and mock their respective disciplines, and a pop ecocriticism book could eas-

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ily do the same. In the Foreword to a pop version of his own theories by Lincoln Barnett, Albert Einstein notes that popularizing theory

succeeds in being intelligible [to the great unwashed either]
by concealing the core of the problem and by offering to the
reader only superficial aspects or vague allusions, thus deceiving
the reader by arousing ... the deceptive illusion of comprehen-

sion; or else [it fails and] ... gives an expert account of
the problem, but in such a fashion that the untrained reader
is unable to follow the exposition and becomes discouraged
from reading any further. (9)

Einstein goes on to say that though little of substance is actually communicated in pop versions of theory, what is communicated is hugely important.

Whether through journalism or narrative, ecocritics have to address the issue of values in ways that connect meaningfully with the non-academic world. If it means through 50 Things You Can Do to Save the Earth, fine. We can't afford professional bigotry. We're losing, and it's time to start winning.

Works Cited


